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This paper provides a new theory to explain empirical puzzles regarding credit
card interchange fees. Our model departs from the existing two-sided market the-
ories by arguing card adoption externalities are less important in a mature card
market. Instead, we focus on card issuer entry, elastic consumer demand and the
role of card transaction value. Our analysis suggests that card networks demand
higher interchange fees to maximize member issuers’ proﬁts as card payments be-
come more eﬃcient and convenient. At equilibrium, consumer rewards and card
transaction values increase with interchange fees, while consumer surplus and mer-
chant proﬁts may not. Based on the theoretical framework, we discuss pros and
cons of policy interventions.
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1.1 Motivation
As credit cards become increasingly prominent forms of payments, the structure and
performance of this industry have attracted intensive scrutiny.1 At the heart of the
controversy are interchange fees - the fees paid to card issuers when merchants accept
their cards for purchase.
Interchange fees are set by credit card networks. Two major card networks, Visa
and MasterCard, each set their interchange fees collectively for tens of thousand member
ﬁnancial institutions that issue and market their cards.2 For one simple example of how
interchange functions, imagine a consumer making a $100 purchase with a credit card. For
that $100 item, the retailer would get approximately $98. The remaining $2, known as the
merchant discount fees, gets divided up. About $1.75 would go to the card issuing bank
as interchange fees, and $0.25 would go to the merchant acquiring bank (the retailer’s
account provider). Interchange fees serve as a key element of the credit card business
model and generate signiﬁcant revenues for card issuers.3 In 2007, the US card issuers
made $42 billion revenue in interchange fees.
In recent years, merchants have become increasingly critical on interchange fees, claim-
ing the fees are excessively high. They pointed out that, despite of falling costs in the
card industry, interchange rates in the US have been rising over the last ten years and
are among the largest and fast-growing costs of doing business for many retailers (see
1There are four types of general purpose payment cards in the US: (1) credit cards; (2) charge cards;
(3) signature debit cards; and (4) PIN debit cards. The analysis of this paper applies to the ﬁrst three
types of cards, which are routed over credit card networks and account for 90% of total card purchase
volume.
2Visa and MasterCard provide card services through member ﬁnancial institutions (card-issuing banks
and merchant-acquiring banks). They are called “four-party” systems and account for approximately 80%
of the US credit card market. Amex and Discover primarily handle all card issuing and acquiring by
themselves. They are called “three-party” systems and account for the remaining 20% of the market. In
a “three-party” system, interchange fees are internal transfers and hence not directly observable. This
paper provides a model for four-party systems, but the analysis can also be applied to three-party systems.
3Note that credit cards may serve two functions: payment and credit. The payment function allows
cardholders to make transaction with cards and generate interchange revenues to card issuers. The credit
function allows cardholders to borrow funds and generate ﬁnance revenues. While this paper focuses on
card payment function and interchange revenues, we need to note that interchange fees may help increase






























































































Figure 1: Credit Card Interchage Fees (IFs) and Transaction Values in the US
Figure 1).4 However, card networks disagree, arguing interchange fees serve the needs of
all parties in the card system, including funding better consumer reward programs that
could also beneﬁtm e r c h a n t s .
In the meantime, many competition authorities and central banks around the world
have taken action on interchange fees. In Australia, the Reserve Bank of Australia man-
dated a sizeable reduction in credit card interchange fees in 2003, and is currently re-
evaluating the regulation. EU, UK, Belgium, Israel, Poland, Portugal, Mexico, New
Zealand, Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland have made similar decisions and moves. In
the US, interchange fees have been mainly challenged by private litigation. Since 2005,
more than 50 antitrust cases have been ﬁled by merchants contesting interchange fees.
The performance of the credit card industry raises following challenging questions:
• Why have interchange fees been increasing given falling costs and increased com-
petition in the card industry (card processing, borrowing and fraud costs have all
declined, while the number of issuers and card solicitations have been rising over
4Data sources: Nilson Report and American Banker, various issues.
2Figure 2: Credit Card Industry Trends: Costs and Competition
recent years, as shown in Figure 2)?5
• Given the rising interchange fees, why can’t merchants refuse to accept cards? Why
have total card transaction values been growing rapidly?
• What are the causes and consequences of the increasing consumer card rewards?
• What are the choices and consequences of policy interventions?
In order to answer these questions, a growing literature on payment card markets has
been developed recently.6 These models, following the pioneering work of Baxter (1983),
emphasize the two-sided market externalities in card payment systems emanating from
the fact that every card transaction must necessarily involve two users – a consumer and
a merchant. According to this literature, it is reasonable for card networks to impose
diﬀerent fees for consumers and merchants in order to balance the demand on the two
5Data sources: Visa USA, Federal Reserve Board, Evans and Schmalense (2005) and Frankel (2006).
6For example, Schmalensee (2002), Rochet and Tirole (2002), Wright (2003), (2004), Schwartz and
Vincent (2006), Hayashi (2006), McAndrews and Wang (2008).
3sides of the market.7 However, it remains an unsettled issue to systematically explain and
evaluate the performance of the card industry.8
1.2 A New Approach
The present paper provides a new theory that addresses the aforementioned issues. The
theory assumes a realistic framework of credit card markets, which consists of compet-
ing payment instruments, e.g., credit cards vs. alternative payment methods;9 rational
consumers (merchants) that always use (accept) the lowest-cost payment instruments;
oligopolistic card networks that set proﬁt-maximizing interchange fees; and competitive
card issuers that join the most proﬁtable network and compete with one another via
consumer rewards.
The model yields equilibrium industry outcome that explains the puzzles regarding
card interchange fees. It is shown that card networks, given their market power, demand
higher interchange fees to maximize member issuers’ proﬁts as card payments become
more eﬃcient and convenient. Therefore, falling costs in the card industry could have
indeed driven up interchange fees. At equilibrium, consumer rewards and card transaction
values increase with interchange fees, but consumer surplus and merchant proﬁts may not.
Our model departs quite bit from the existing two-sided market theories. First, be-
cause we are studying a mature card market, we do not consider card adoption exter-
nalities between merchants and consumers. Instead, we assume the set of card users is
exogenously given. Second, we relax many restrictive assumptions in previous studies
including consumers have ﬁxed demand for goods; merchants engage in imperfect com-
petition (e.g., Hotelling); and there is no entry/exit of card issuers. Instead, we assume
7Payment card systems are not the only case of such two-sided markets. Rochet and Tirole (2003)
provide a detailed analysis of other examples, such as the software industry, video games, internet portals,
medias, and shopping malls. In all these industries as well, the platforms may price diﬀerently to each
side of the markets in order to balance the demand, while making a proﬁt overall.
8These theories show that, although the socially optimal and privately optimal levels of card fees
both depend on the same factors (e.g., issuing costs, acquiring costs, cardholders’ and merchants’ de-
mand elasticities, market structure, and bargaining power of the parties), they are not equal in general.
However, given various complications of the models, there is generally no way to tell that the card fees
are systematically too high or too low, as compared with socially optimal levels (Katz 2001, Hunt 2003,
Rochet 2003, Rochet and Tirole 2006).
9Alternative payment methods may include cash, check, PIN debit cards, stored value cards, auto-
mated clearing houses (ACH) and etc.
4competitive merchants, free entry/exit of card issuers, oligopolistic card networks, and
allows for elastic consumer demand.10
As a result, our model views the credit card industry as a vertical control system
with monopolistic networks on top of price taking intermediates and end users. Card
networks, in order to pursue their proﬁts, set card fees to exploit the intensive margin of
card usage by inﬂating the card transaction value. This is in contrast with the typical
analyses of two-sided market theories that focus on the extensive margin of card usage
(e.g., inducing more merchants and consumers to use cards). We found that card networks,
by charging high interchange fees, can inﬂate retail prices to create more demand for
their payment services. As card payments become more eﬃcient and convenient than
alternative payment instruments, card networks are able to further raise interchange fees
and extract more proﬁts (eﬃciency rents) out of the system. Meanwhile, due to higher
retail prices, consumer surplus and merchant proﬁts may not improve.
Our theory provides a new perspective that complements the two-sided market lit-
erature. In reality, card networks’ incentive of inﬂating retail prices may coexist with
two-sided market externalities. This is shown in the work of McAndrews and Wang
(2008), which extends the analysis to an emerging card market where card networks set
card fees to balance the “two-sided market eﬀect” and the “inﬂation eﬀect.” Their re-
sults show that a monopoly card network charges a higher interchange fee than the social
optimum, and exploits both intensive and extensive margins of card usage.
1.3 Road Map
Section 2 sets up a model of a “four-party” card system with merchants, consumers,
acquirers, issuers and card networks. The model shows that a monopoly card network
demands higher interchange fees to maximize member issuers’ proﬁts as card payments
become more eﬃcient or convenient. At equilibrium, consumer rewards and card trans-
action values increase with interchange fees, while consumer surplus and merchant proﬁts
10Our model is also diﬀerent from the existing theories by assuming that payment cards charge pro-
portional fees instead of ﬁxed per-transaction fees. This is motivated by the fact that only cards charging
proportional fees that have pricing controversies in reality. However, assuming either proportional fees













Figure 3: A Four-PartyC r e d i tC a r dS y s t e m
do not. We show these ﬁndings could also hold under oligopolistic card networks. Section
3 extends the model to evaluate various policy interventions. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Setup
A four-party card system is composed of ﬁve players: merchants, consumers, acquires,
issuers, and card networks, as illustrated in Figure 3. They are modeled as follows.
Merchants: A continuum of identical merchants sell a homogenous good in the mar-
ket.11 The competition leads to zero proﬁt. Let p and k be price and non-payment cost
for the good respectively. Merchants have two options to receive payments. Accepting
non-card payments, such as cash, costs merchants τm,a per dollar, which includes the
handling, storage, and safekeeping expenses that merchants have to bear. Accepting card
11Assuming identical merchants implies merchants always make zero proﬁt regardless of interchange
fees. In Appendix B, we relax this assumption and instead assume that merchants are heterogenous in
costs, in which case merchants’ proﬁts are shown to be negatively aﬀected by interchange fees.
6payments costs merchants τm,e per dollar plus a merchant discount rate S p e rd o l l a rp a i d
to merchant acquirers. Therefore, a merchant who does not accept cards (i.e., cash store)




; pe =m a x (
k
1 − τm,e − S
,p a).
We require pe ≥ pa so that (1−τm,a)pe ≥ k, which ensures card stores do not incur losses
in case someone uses cash for purchase. This condition implies S ≥ τm,a−τm,e. Moreover,
we require 1 − τm,e >Sso that pe is positive.
Consumers: There are two types of consumers. One is cash users, who do not own
cards and have to pay with cash. The other is card users, who have option to pay either
with card or cash. To use each payment instrument, consumers incur costs on handling,
storage and safekeeping. Using cash costs consumers τc,a per dollar while using card costs
τc,e. In addition, card users receive a reward R from card issuers for each dollar spent on
cards.12 Therefore, card users do not shop at cash stores if and only if





1 − τm,e − S
.
Meanwhile, given pa ≤ pe, cash users prefer shopping at cash stores, and card users have
no incentive to ever use cash in card stores.13
When making a purchase decision, card users face the after-reward price
pr =( 1+τc,e − R)
k
1 − τm,e − S
,
and have the total demand for card transaction values TD:
TD= peD(pr)=
k
1 − τm,e − S
D[
k
1 − τm,e − S
(1 + τc,e − R)],
12Although our analysis focuses on the payment but not the credit function of credit cards, the reward
R could be interpreted to include some beneﬁts that consumers receive from the credit function of cards.
See Chakravorti and To (2007) for related discussions.
13In reality, some consumers may use cash in stores that accept credit cards. In theory, this can happen
if cash stores have a higher unit cost k than card stores. However, to keep our analysis focused, we do
not explicitly explore this issue in the paper.
7where D is the demand function for goods.
Acquirers: The acquiring market is competitive, where each acquirer receives a
merchant discount rate S from merchants and pays an interchange rate I to card issuers.
Acquiring incurs a constant cost C for each dollar of transaction. For simplicity, we
normalize C =0so acquirers play no role in our analysis but pass through the merchant
discount as interchange fee to the issuers, i.e., S = I (see Rochet and Tirole 2002 for a
similar treatment).14
Issuers: The issuing market is competitive, where each issuer receives an interchange
rate I from acquirers and pays a reward rate R to consumers for each dollar spent on
card. An issuer α incurs a ﬁxed cost K each period, and an issuing cost V β
α /α to handle
its card transaction value Vα,w h e r eβ>1.15 Issuers are heterogenous in their operational
eﬃciency α, which is distributed with pdf g(α) over the population. They also pay the
card network a processing fee T per dollar transaction and share their proﬁts with the
network.16
Issuer α’s proﬁt πα (before sharing with the network) is determined as follows:
πα = Max
Vα


















β−1(I − R − T)
β
β−1 − K.
Free entry condition requires that the marginal issuer α∗ breaks even, so we have
14Note C =0is an innocuous assumption because C is mathematically equivalent to the network
processing cost T in the following analysis. Moreover, we could instead model acquirers with heterogenous
costs, but that would just duplicate our analysis of issuers.
15Assuming convex issuing costs is critical for our analysis. This is in contrast with some early studies
(e.g., Wright 2003, Gans and King 2003) who found interchange fees are neutral (undetermined) under
constant (zero) issuing costs. By assuming convex costs and issuer competition, we are able to pin down
a unique interchange fee and characterize its properties. In reality, the issuing costs include the costs
for providing credit ﬂoat, fraud protection and other customer services. These costs depend on the gross
value of card transactions but not the net (after-reward) transaction value. Also note that our model does
not pin down the aggregate price level of the economy, but only the price levels for those sub-markets
using cards. Therefore, as nominal card transaction values increase, card issuers incur increasing real
costs.
16In reality, T refers to the Transaction Processing Fees that card networks collect from their members
to process each card transaction through its central system, which is typically cost-based. In addition,
card networks charge their members Service Fees based on each member’s contribution to the network
including the number of card issued, total transaction and sales volume. (Source: Visa USA By-Laws).
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Networks: Each period, a card network incurs a variable cost T p e rd o l l a rf o r
processing card transactions. In return, it charges its member issuers a processing fee T
to cover the variable costs and receives a share of their proﬁts (the share is determined by
bargaining between the card network and member issuers). As a result, the card network
sets the interchange fee I to maximize the total proﬁts for its member issuers, which also
maximizes its own proﬁt.
2.2 Monopoly Outcome
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1 − τm,e − I
, (Pricing Constraint I)












β−1g(α)dα, (Total Card Supply)
TD=
k
1 − τm,e − I
D(
k
1 − τm,e − I
(1 + τc,e − R)), (Total Card Demand)
TV = TD. (Card Market Clearing)
To simplify the analysis, we assume that α follows a Pareto distribution so that g(α)=
γLγ/(αγ+1),w h e r eγ>1 and βγ > 1+γ;17 the consumer demand function takes the
isoelastic form D = ηp−ε
r ; and the pricing constraint 1 − τm,e >I≥ τm,a − τm,e is not




m = A(I − R − T)
βγ (Card Network Proﬁt)
s.t. B(I − R −T)
βγ−1 =( 1−τm,e − I)
ε−1(1 + τc,e −R)
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17The size distribution of card issuers, like ﬁrm size distribution in many other industries, is highly
positively skewed. Although possible candidates for this group of distributions are far from unique, Pareto
distribution has typically been used as a reasonable and tractable example in the empirical IO literature.
18For simplicity, we assume the consumer demand D to be a ﬁx e df u n c t i o no fp r i c epr.A l l o w i n gt h e
demand function to shift, e.g., by an exogenous increase of η due to income growth, would not aﬀect our
theoretical analysis, though empirically it may help explain the increase of card transaction values.
10To simplify notation, we hereafter refer to the “Card Market Clearing Equation” as the
“CMC Equation”; and refer to “Pricing Constraint I” as the “API Constraint”, where API
stands for “Alternative Payment Instruments”. We denote the card markup Z = I − R,




m = A(Z − T)
βγ (Card Network Proﬁt)
s.t. B(Z − T)
βγ−1 =( 1− τm,e − I)





1+τc,e + Z − I
1 − τm,e − I
, (API Constraint)
where A,B are deﬁned as before. Now it has become clear that a monopoly network
would like to choose an interchange fee Im to maximize the card markup Z. To fully
characterize the monopoly outcome, we need to discuss two scenarios: elastic demand
(ε>1) and inelastic demand (ε ≤ 1).
2.2.1 Elastic Demand: ε>1





1+τc,e + Zm − I








Therefore, if the API constraint is not binding, the maximum is determined by the fol-
lowing conditions:
1+τc,e + Z − I






βγ−1 =( 1− τm,e − I)











11Proposition 1 then characterizes the monopoly interchange fee Im as follows.
Proposition 1 Given consumer demand is elastic and the API constraint is not binding
(i.e., ε >
1+τc,a
τc,a+τm,a > 1), the monopoly interchange fee Im increases if card service becomes
less costly ( i.e., T, τm,e or τc,e is lower) or the issuers’ ﬁxed cost K becomes lower, but
Im is not aﬀected by the costs of using non-card payments τm,a or τc,a.
Proof. Equations (1)-(3) suggest that ∂Im/∂T < 0,∂ I m/∂τm,e < 0,∂ I m/∂τc,e < 0,
∂Im/∂K < 0, but ∂Im/∂τm,a =0 ,∂ I m/∂τc,a =0 .
Similarly, we can derive comparative statics for the other endogenous variables at the
monopoly maximum, including the card markup Zm, the consumer reward Rm = Im−Zm,
the issuer α’s proﬁt πα and transaction value Vα, the number of issuers N,t h ec a r d
network’s proﬁt Ωm and transaction value TV, before-reward retail price pe,a f t e r - r e w a r d
retail price pr, and card users’ consumption D. All the analytical results are reported in
Table 1 (See Appendix A for proofs).
Table 1. Comparative Statics: ε >
1+τc,a
τc,a+τm,a > 1
(Signs of Partial Derivatives)
Im Rm Zm πα Vα N Ωm TV p e pr D
τm,e −−−− − −−−−00
τc,e − ± −−− −−−−00
T −−+ −−−− − −00
K −−+ ± + − + −−00
τm,a 0000 0 0000 0 0
τc,a 0000 0 0000 0 0
Table 1 suggests that everything else being equal, we have the following ﬁndings:
• As it becomes less costly for merchants to accept cards (a lower τm,e), both inter-
change fee and consumer reward increase, but interchange fee increases more and
leads to a higher card markup. Meanwhile, the proﬁt and transaction value of
12individual issuers increase, the number of issuers increases, total proﬁt and trans-
action value of the card network increase, and before-reward retail price increases.
However, after-reward retail price and card users’ consumption stay the same.
• The above eﬀects also hold if it becomes less costly for consumers to use card (a
lower τc,e) or it costs less for the network to provide card services (a lower T). Note
for a lower τc,e, consumer reward can either increase or decrease; and for a lower T,
card markup decreases.
• As the ﬁxed cost K for card issuers falls, both interchange fee and consumer re-
ward increase, but consumer reward increases more and leads to a decrease of card
markup. As a result, all incumbent issuers suﬀer a decline in transaction value,
while large issuers’ proﬁts decrease, but small issuers’ proﬁts increase. Meanwhile,
the number of issuers increases, card network proﬁt decreases while transaction value
increases, and before-reward retail price increases. However, after-reward retail price
stays the same and there is no change in card users’ consumption.
• Merchants or consumers’ costs of using non-card payment instruments, τm,a and
τc,a, have no eﬀect on any of the endogenous variables.
Alternatively, if the API constraint is binding, the monopoly maximum satisﬁes the
following conditions:
B(Z − T)
βγ−1 =( 1− τm,e − I)





1+τc,e + Z − I











Proposition 2 then characterizes the monopoly interchange fee Im as follows.
13Proposition 2 Given consumer demand is elastic and the API constraint is binding (i.e.,
1+τc,a
τc,a+τm,a >ε>1), the monopoly interchange fee Im increases if card service becomes less
costly ( i.e., T, τm,e or τc,e is lower) or issuers’ ﬁxed cost K becomes lower, but decreases
if the cost of using non-card payments (τm,a or τc,a) becomes lower.
Proof. Equations (4)-(6) suggest that ∂Im/∂T < 0,∂ I m/∂τm,e < 0,∂ I m/∂τc,e < 0,
∂Im/∂K < 0, but ∂Im/∂τm,a > 0,∂ I m/∂τc,a > 0.
Table 2. Comparative Statics:
1+τc,a
τc,a+τm,a >ε>1
(Signs of Partial Derivatives)
Im Rm Zm πα Vα N Ωm TV p e pr D
τm,a ++++ + ++++ + −
τc,a ++++ + ++++ + −
τm,e, τc,e, T, K Same signs as Table 1
Similarly, we can derive comparative statics for the other endogenous variables at the
maximum. As shown in Table 2, we have the following ﬁndings:
• As it becomes less costly for merchants or consumers to use non-card payment
instruments (a lower τm,a or τc,a), interchange fee decreases more than consumer
reward, which leads to a decrease in card markup. Meanwhile, the proﬁt and trans-
action value of individual issuers decrease, the number of issuers decreases, and the
card network proﬁt and transaction value decrease. In addition, before-and-after
reward retail prices decrease and card users’ consumption increases.
• The eﬀe c t so fo t h e rv a r i a b l e sa r et h es a m ea sT a b l e1 .
Figure 4 provides an intuitive illustration for the analysis. In the two graphs, the
CMC equation describes a concave relationship between the card markup Z (Note the
network proﬁt Ωm increases with Z) and the interchange fee I ∈ [τm,a − τm,e,1 − τm,e).
In Case (1), the API constraint is not binding so the monopoly card network can price at
the interior maximum, on which τm,a or τc,a has no eﬀect. Alternatively, in Case (2), the
14Figure 4: Monopoly Interchange Fee under Elastic Demand
API constraint is binding so τm,a or τc,a does aﬀect the interchange pricing. Particularly,
at the constrained maximum (Im, Zm), the curve of the CMC equation has a slope less
than 1. As a result, a local change of τm,a or τc,a shifts the line of the API constraint,
but Zm changes less than Im so that ∂Rm/τm,a > 0 and ∂Rm/τc,a > 0. Furthermore, in
Cases (1) and (2), changes of other parameters, such as τm,e, τc,e, T, K,s h i f tt h ec u r v e
of CMC equation and aﬀect the interchange pricing as described in Tables 1 and 2.
2.2.2 Inelastic Demand: ε 6 1
When demand is inelastic (ε 6 1), the CMC equation suggests that Z is an increasing
function of I (i.e., ∂Z/∂I > 0) and there is no interior maximum. Therefore, the API
constraint is binding. The maximum satisﬁes the following conditions:
B(Z − T)
βγ−1 =( 1− τm,e − I)





1+τc,e + Z − I
1 − τm,e − I
. (8)
15Proposition 3 then characterizes the monopoly interchange fee Im as follows.
Proposition 3 Given consumer demand is inelastic (i.e., ε 6 1), the API constraint is
binding and the monopoly interchange fee Im increases if card service becomes less costly
( i.e., T, τm,e or τc,e is lower) or issuers’ ﬁxed cost K becomes lower, but decreases if the
cost of using non-card payments (τm,a or τc,a) becomes lower.
Proof. Equations (7)-(8) suggest that ∂Im/∂T < 0,∂ I m/∂τm,e < 0,∂ I m/∂τc,e < 0,
∂Im/∂K < 0, but ∂Im/∂τm,a > 0,∂ I m/∂τc,a > 0.
Table 3. Comparative Statics: ε ≤ 119
(Signs of Partial Derivatives)
Im Rm Zm πα Vα N Ω TV p e pr D
τm,a + ± +++ + +++ + −
τc,a + ± +++ + +++ + −
τm,e, τc,e, T, K Same signs as Tables 1 and 2
Similarly, we can derive comparative statics for the other endogenous variables at the
maximum. As shown in Table 3, we have the following ﬁndings:
• The eﬀects of τm,a and τc,a are the same as Table 2 except that consumer reward
may either increase or decrease.
• The eﬀe c t so fo t h e rv a r i a b l e sa r et h es a m ea sT a b l e s1a n d2 .
Figure 5 provides an intuitive illustration of the analysis. In the two graphs, the CMC
equation describes an increasing and convex relationship between the card markup Z
(Note the network proﬁt Ωm increases with Z) and the interchange fee I ∈ [τm,a−τm,e,1−
τm,e). Therefore, the API constraint is binding so τm,a and τc,a aﬀect the interchange
pricing. In Case (3), at the constrained maximum (Im, Zm),t h ec u r v eo ft h eC M C
19Notice that for ε =0 ,w eh a v e∂D/∂τm,a = ∂D/∂τc,a =0 .
16Figure 5: Monopoly Interchange Fee under Inelastic Demand
equation has a slope less than 1. As a result, a local change of τm,a or τc,a shifts the line of
the API constraint, but Zm changes less than Im so that ∂Rm/τm,a > 0 and ∂Rm/τc,a > 0.
Alternatively, in Case (4), at the constrained maximum (Im, Zm), the curve of the CMC
equation has a slope greater than 1 so that ∂Rm/τm,a < 0 and ∂Rm/τc,a < 0.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
changes of other parameters, such as τm,e, τc,e, T, K, shift the curve of CMC equation
and aﬀect the interchange pricing as described in Table 3.
2.2.3 Recap and Remarks
As shown in the above analysis, under a monopoly card network, equilibrium interchange
fees tend to increase as card payments become more eﬃcient/convenient (a lower τm,e, τc,e
or T) or as the issuers’ market becomes more competitive (a lower K).20 These ﬁndings
oﬀer a consistent explanation for the puzzle of rising interchange fees. Meanwhile, we
show that consumer rewards and card transaction values increase with interchange fees,
but consumer welfare may not improve.
20As mentioned, the network processing cost T is mathematically equivalent to the acquiring cost C.
Hence, a decrease of acquiring costs may also contribute to the increase of interchange fees.
17The theory also explains other puzzles in the credit card market. For example, why
can’t merchants refuse to accept cards given the rising interchange fees? The answer is
simple: As card payments become increasingly more eﬃcient and convenient than alterna-
tive payment instruments, card networks can aﬀord charging higher interchange fees but
still keep cards as a competitive payment service to merchants and consumers. Another
puzzle is why card networks, from a cross-section point of view, charge lower interchange
fees on transaction categories with lower fraud costs, e.g., face-to-face purchases with card
present are generally charged a lower interchange rate than online purchases without card
present. This might seem to contradict the time-series evidence that interchange fees
increase as fraud costs decrease. Our analysis suggests that the answer lies on the dif-
ferent API constraints that card networks face in diﬀerent payment environments. In an
environment with higher fraud costs for cards, such as online shopping, the costs of using
a non-card payment instrument are also likely to be higher, which allows card networks
to demand higher interchange fees.
The card networks underwent structural changes recently. Allegedly not-for-proﬁt,
MasterCard and Visa changed their status to for-proﬁt and went public in 2005 and 2008
respectively. However, many industry observers feel that both networks have always been
for-proﬁt. In fact, no evidence shows that the networks changed their behavior after the
IPO, which provides further support for our assumption of proﬁt-maximizing networks.21
2.3 Duopoly Outcome
So far, we have discussed the monopoly outcome in the credit card market. To extend
our analysis to a more realistic setting, we may consider a duopoly card market where
two card networks (e.g., Visa and MasterCard) that produce homogenous card services
have the same cost structure as speciﬁed in Section 2.1. Let Ωi(Iit,I jt) denote network i’s
proﬁta tp e r i o dt when it charges interchange fee Iit and its rival charges Ijt.N e t w o r ki
maximizes the present discounted value of its proﬁts, Ui =
P∞
t=0 δ
tΩi(Iit,I jt), where δ is
21Note that because monopoly pricing is not by itself considered an antitrust issue, being an independent
public ﬁrm may help card networks to get round the antitrust charges. According to many industry
observers, this is the main reason for the networks to undertake the organizational changes (MacDonald
2006).
18the discount factor.
First, consider the case that the two networks engage in a simple Bertrand competition.
At each period t, the networks choose their interchange fees (Iit,I jt) simultaneously. If the
two networks charge the same interchange fee Iit = Ijt = It, they share the market, that
is Ωi = Ωj = 1
2Ωm(It),w h e r eΩm(It) is the monopoly network proﬁta tt h ei n t e r c h a n g e
level It. Otherwise, the lower-interchange network may capture the whole market. This
is suggested by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Everything else being equal, the after-reward retail price pr increases with
the interchange fee I.
Proof. The CMC equation suggests that ∂pr/∂I > 0.
Proposition 4 says that a lower interchange fee results in a lower after-reward retail
price, so a lower-interchange network is able to attract all the merchants and card con-
sumers.22 This implies that two card networks, if engaging in a Bertrand competition,
should both set interchange fee at the minimum level I = τm,a − τm,e,g i v e nb yt h eE q .
(Pricing Constraint II).23 This is the competitive equilibrium outcome.
However, the outcome could be diﬀerent in a repeated game. Particularly, if each
network’s interchange strategy at period t is allowed to depend on the history of previous
interchanges Ht ≡ (Ii0,I j0;...;Iit−1,I jt−1),i ti sp o s s i b l ef o rt h em o n o p o l yo u t c o m et ob e
supported at equilibrium.
Consider a simple Forgiving Trigger (FT) strategy, which prescribes collusion in the
ﬁrst period, and then n periods of defection for every defection of any player, followed
by reverting to cooperation no matter what has occurred during the punishment phase.
Therefore, if a network undercuts the monopoly interchange fee Im,i tm a ye a r nam a x i -
mum proﬁt Ωm(Im) during the period of deviation (indeed it earns approximately Ωm(Im)
by slightly undercutting) but then it receives much lower proﬁtf o rn periods. As shown
22Rysman (2007) found that consumers tend to concentrate their spending on a single payment network
(single-homing), but many of them maintain unused cards that allow the ability to use multiple networks
(multihoming). Therefore, consumers and merchants can easily switch between networks.
23We reasonably assume τm,a >τ m,e, so the minimum interchange fee is positive. Otherwise, consumers
have to pay for the card use (i.e., the reward is negative).
19by the Folk Theorem, for a given n,i fIp is low and δ i sl a r g e ,( F T ,F T )i sas u b g a m e
perfect Nash equilibrium, and Im can be supported at equilibrium.
This result suggests that a collusion could happen in the card market for two reasons.
First, the model shows that the collusion can be supported at equilibrium if δ is large. This
is because tacit collusion is enforced by punishment, which can occur only when deviation
is detected. In the card industry, most card issuers are members of both Visa and Master-
Card, so interchange fees tend to be public knowledge between the two networks. Second,
an inﬁnitely repeated game may have multiple equilibria. But as a natural method, the
networks may coordinate on an equilibrium that yields a Pareto-optimal point for the two
networks, that is the monopoly outcome. Meanwhile, a symmetric equilibrium appears
to be consistent with the empirical observation that Visa and MasterCard have almost
identical network structures and market shares.
Although it remains to be an empirical question to tell which equilibrium (competitive
equilibrium or collusive equilibrium) the card market is at, our theory suggests that a
possible collusive equilibrium could cause concerns about the card industry performance.
3 Policy and Welfare Analysis
The above analysis suggests that oligopolistic card networks could set interchange fees
at the monopoly level at a collusive equilibrium. Although this remains an empirically
testable hypothesis, in case it is true, competition authorities then have reason to consider
intervening the card markets.
3.1 Policy Interventions
In many countries, public authorities have chosen to regulate down interchange fees. Our
theory provides a formal framework to study the implications of these policy interventions.
3.1.1 Price Cut
As shown in Proposition 4, ∂pr/∂I > 0, which says a lower interchange fee results in a
lower after-reward retail price and hence higher card users’ consumption. Therefore, in
20order to increase consumer surplus, public authorities may want to cut interchange fees.
Recall the CMC equation
B(Z − T)
βγ−1 =( 1− τm,e − I)
ε−1(1 + τc,e + Z − I)
−ε.
The following proposition predicts the likely eﬀects:
Proposition 5 Everything else being equal, reducingt h ei n t e r c h a n g er a t er e s u l t si na
lower card markup, lower proﬁts and transaction value for card issuers, fewer issuers,
lower before-and-after-reward retail prices, and higher card users’ consumption. For elas-
tic demand, consumer reward decreases; and for inelastic demand, consumer reward may
either decrease or increase.
Proof. The CMC equation suggests that for I<I m, we have ∂Z/∂I > 0,∂ π α/∂I > 0,
∂Vα/∂I > 0,∂ N / ∂ I>0,∂ Ω/∂I > 0,∂ p e/∂I > 0,∂ p r/∂I > 0,∂ D / ∂ I<0, and
∂R/∂I > 0 for ε>1,∂ R / ∂ I≷ 0 for ε ≤ 1.
3.1.2 Price Ceiling
A one-time price cut, however, may only have temporary eﬀects because the interchange
fees can easily come back. Alternatively, public authorities may set an interchange ceiling
Ic <I m.24 Given a binding interchange ceiling Ic, the market outcome is determined by
the modiﬁed CMC equation:
B(Z − T)
βγ−1 =( 1− τm,e − I
c)
ε−1(1 + τc,e + Z − I
c)
−ε,
where Ic is a constant. As a result, any changes of environmental parameters will then
aﬀect the industry diﬀerently from the non-intervention scenario.
Table 4 reports comparative statics of endogenous variables for an elastic demand
(ε>1), which suggests that a binding interchange ceiling yields the following results:
24In 2003, Reserve Bank of Australia introduced a price ceiling for credit card interchange fees. At the
time, the interchange fees averaged around 0.95% of the card transaction value. The regulation required
that the weighted-average interchange fee for both Visa and MasterCard systems could not exceed 0.5%
of the transaction value. The regulation is currently due for review, and one notable ﬁnding is that card
rewards have been eﬀectively reduced.
21Table 4. Comparative Statics: ε>1 and Ic is binding
(Signs of Partial Derivatives)
Ic Rc Zc πα Vα N Ωc TV pe pr D
τm,e 0+−−−−−− ++−
τc,e 0+−−−−−− 0+ −
T 0 − + −−−−− 0+ −
K 0 − + ± + − + − 0+ −
τm,a 0000000 0 000
τc,a 0000000 0 000
• As it becomes less costly for merchants or consumers to use card (a lower τm,e or
τc,e), consumer reward decreases, which leads to an increase in card markup. As a
result, the proﬁt and transaction value of individual issuers increase, the number of
issuers increases, card network proﬁts and transaction values increase, after-reward
retail price decreases, and card users’ consumption increases. Meanwhile, a lower
τm,e results in a lower before-reward price, but a lower τc,e does not aﬀect the
before-reward price.
• The above eﬀects also hold if it costs less for card networks to process card transac-
tions (a lower T). Note for a lower T, consumer reward increases and card markup
decreases.
• As the ﬁxed cost K for card issuers falls, consumer reward increases and leads
to a decrease of card markup. As a result, all incumbent issuers suﬀer a decline
in transaction value, while large issuers’ proﬁts decrease, but small issuers’ proﬁts
increase. Meanwhile, the number of issuers increases, card network proﬁts decrease
but transaction values increase, after-reward retail price decreases, and card users’
consumption increases. However, before-reward retail price stays the same.
• Merchants or consumers’ costs of using non-card payment instruments (τm,a and
τc,a)h a v en oe ﬀect on any of the endogenous variables.
22Table 5. Comparative Statics: 0 <ε≤ 1 and Ic is binding
(Signs of Partial Derivatives)
Ic Rc Zc πα Vα N Ωc TV pe pr D
τm,e (ε<1) 0 − ++++++ ++ −
(ε =1 ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + −
τc,e, T, K, τm,a, τc,a S a m es i g n sa sT a b l e4
Table 5 reports comparative statics of endogenous variables for an inelastic demand
(0 <ε≤ 1), which suggests that a binding interchange ceiling yields the following re-
sults:25
• For a unit elastic demand (ε =1 ), a lower τm,e has no eﬀect on card pricing, output
and proﬁts. For an inelastic demand (ε<1), a lower τm,e will have opposite eﬀects
on card pricing, output and proﬁts as the elastic demand. However, regardless
of demand elasticity, a lower τm,e always lowers the before-and-after-reward retail
prices and raises card users’ consumption (except for a perfectly inelastic demand).
• The eﬀe c t so fo t h e rv a r i a b l e sa r et h es a m ea sT a b l e4 .
The ﬁndings in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that a binding interchange fee ceiling allows card
users to beneﬁt from technology progress or enhanced competition in the card industry.
These results are in sharp contrast with what we have seen in Tables 1, 2 and 3 for the
non-intervention scenarios.
Figure 6 illustrates the eﬀects of the interchange ceiling. In the two graphs for Cases (5)
and (6), the API constraint is not binding so τm,a and τc,a have no eﬀects. Furthermore,
changes in the other parameters, such as τm,e, τc,e, T, K, shift the curve of the CMC
equation. However, given a binding interchange ceiling, these changes can not raise the
level of the interchange fee, but may aﬀect other industry variables as described in Tables
4a n d5 .
25For a perfectly inelastic demand (ε =0 ), the results are reported in Table 6 in Appendix A.
23Figure 6: Interchange Fee Ceiling under Elastic/Inelastic Demand
3.2 Socially Optimal Pricing
Given the structure of credit card industry, our analysis shows consumer surplus decreases
with interchange fees. However, it may not be socially optimal to set the interchange fee at
its minimum level. In fact, the social planner aims to maximize the social surplus, which
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, (Pricing Constraint I)












β−1g(α)dα, (Total Card Supply)
TD=
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1 − τm,e − I
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k
1 − τm,e − I
(1 + τc,e − R)), (Total Card Demand)
TV = TD. (Card Market Clearing)
As before, we assume that α follows a Pareto distribution g(α)=γLγ/(αγ+1), the con-
sumer demand function takes the isoelastic form D(pr)=ηp−ε
r , and the pricing constraint
1 − τm,e >I≥ τm,a − τm,e is not binding.











s.t. B(Z − T)
βγ−1 =( 1− τm,e − I)





1+τc,e + Z − I
1 − τm,e − I
, (API Constraint)
25where Z = I − R, pr =
k(1+τc,e+Z−I)
(1−τm,e−I) ,a n dA, B are deﬁned as before. Similarly, we can
derive the social planner’s problem for ε ≤ 1 (see Appendix A).
Let Is denote the socially optimal interchange fee. Note that the social surplus consists
of two parts. One is card issuers’ proﬁts, which increase with the interchange fee. The
other is consumer surplus, which decreases with the interchange fee. Therefore, we expect
that this yields an interchange fee Is lower than the monopoly level Im,a ss h o w ni nt h e
following proposition.
Proposition 6 The socially optimal interchange fee Is is generally lower than the monopoly
interchange fee Im, i.e., Is ≤ Im.
Proof. This result holds for both elastic and inelastic demand. See Appendix A for the
proof.
3.3 Further Issues
Our policy and welfare analysis oﬀers some justiﬁcation for the concerns and actions
that public authorities worldwide have on the credit card interchange fees. Meanwhile,
our analysis also provides a framework to discuss additional issues with various policy
interventions.
First, we treated technological progress in payments (both cards and non-card pay-
ments) as exogenous in the model. Based on this, regulating down interchange fees appears
to be desirable. However, it is likely in reality that advances in card technology are driven
by intended R&D eﬀorts by the card networks, and network proﬁts provide important
incentives and resources for these eﬀorts. With endogenous technology progress, the social
surplus calculation becomes more complicated. On one hand, regulating down interchange
fees may raise consumer surplus, but on the other hand, it could hurt technology progress
in the card industry and cause eﬃciency losses in the long run. Moreover, the extra proﬁts
in the card industry may also provide incentives for inventing and developing alternative
payment products/technologies. All these endogenous and dynamic factors may make the
welfare results of interchange regulation less clear and obvious.
26Second, our analysis assumed that the market costs of payment instruments reﬂect
their social costs. In reality, this may not be true. In some cases, when market costs
of alternative payment instruments are lower than their social costs, the binding API
constraint of card pricing may already lower interchange fees from where they otherwise
would be. Therefore, learning about total social costs of various payment instruments is
a prerequisite for designing and implementing good policy in payment markets.
Third, we abstracted from some potentially important issues in our analysis. For
example, we assume that merchants are perfectly competitive, so we do not consider their
s t r a t e g i cm o t i v e so fa c c e p t i n gc a r d s .A n dt h en o - s u r c h a r g er u l ed o e sn o tp l a yar o l ei no u r
model because competitive merchants specialize on serving either card users or cash users.
Assuming competitive merchants might be a reasonable assumption for many markets,
but certainly not for all. It would be interesting to relax this assumption and investigate
the implications.
Fourth, direct price regulation is not the only option or necessarily the best option
for public authorities to improve market outcomes. There are other policy mixes worthy
of exploring. In the case of credit card industry, regulating interchange fee is a quick
solution but might be arbitrary and less adaptable. Policy makers may consider alternative
approaches that target the market structure (e.g., enforcing competition between card
networks)26 or competing products (e.g., encouraging technology progress in non-card
payments). In addition, increasing public scrutiny and rising regulatory threat may also
be eﬀective policy measures (see Stango 2003).
Last but not least, policy interventions may render unintended consequences. This is
more likely to happen in a complex environment like the credit card industry. Therefore,
a thorough study of the market structure can not be over emphasized. This paper is
one of the beginning steps toward this direction, and many issues need further research,
including the market deﬁnition of various payment instruments, the competition between
four-party systems and three-party systems, and the causes and consequents of credit card
rules, just to name a few.
26There may be many ways to re-design the card market to enforce competition, for example, introduc-
ing multi-network cards, requiring bilateral interchange fees between issuers and merchants, or reforming
the network ownership/governance structure.
274C o n c l u s i o n
As credit cards become an increasingly prominent form of payments, the structure and
performance of this industry have attracted intensive scrutiny. This paper presents an
industry equilibrium model to better understand this market.
Our model takes a diﬀerent approach from the existing literature. First, we model a
mature card market without network eﬀects given the fact that card adoption externality
has become less important at this stage. Second, we relax many restrictive assumptions
used in the previous studies: consumers have a ﬁxed demand for goods; merchants engage
in imperfect competition; and there is no entry/exit of card issuers. Instead, we assume
competitive merchants, free entry/exit of card issuers, oligopolistic networks, and allows
for elastic consumer demand.
The new model oﬀers a more realistic and arguably better analytical framework. It is
shown that card networks tend to charge high interchange fees to inﬂate retail prices in
order to create more demand for their payment services. As card payments become more
eﬃcient and convenient, card networks are able to further raise the interchange fees and
extract more proﬁts (eﬃciency rents) out of the system. Meanwhile, due to higher retail
prices, consumer surplus and merchant proﬁts may not improve. Based on the theoretical
framework, the pros and cons of policy interventions are discussed.
Appendix A.
Proof. (Table 1): Results in the ﬁrst column are given by Proposition 1. Note Eqs. FOC
and CMC imply
B(Z − T)
βγ−1 =( ε − 1)
ε−1(ε)
−ε(τc,e + Z + τm,e)
−1.
The results in column 3 then are derived by implicit diﬀerentiation. Recall that all other
endogenous variables are functions of Z, I and parameters:
















α∗ g(α)dα =( L/α∗)γ, Ωm = A(Z − T)βγ,






















The other results in the table then are derived by diﬀerentiation.
Proof. Table 6 below reports comparative statics for the case of perfectly inelastic de-
mand (ε =0 ).
Table 6. Comparative Statics: ε =0and Ic is binding
(Signs of Partial Derivatives)
Ic Rc Zc πα Vα N Ωc TV pe pr D
τm,e 0 − ++++++ ++0
τc,e 0000000 0 0+ 0
T 0 − +0000 0 0+ 0
K 0 − + ± + − +00 + 0
τm,a 0000000 0 000
τc,a 0000000 0 000











Consider the following two cases. First, if the API constraint is not binding, the
monopoly’s problem requires ∂Zm/∂Im =0for the CMC equation. Accordingly, the















29since Proposition 4 shows ∂pr/∂I > 0. Therefore, Is <I m. Alternatively, if the API
constraint is binding, (Zm,I m) have to satisfy both the CMC equation and the API


















Then, if ∂Ωs/∂Im < 0,w eh a v eIs <I m; otherwise, if ∂Ωs/∂Im > 0, Is = Im.
For ε ≤ 1, the analysis would be very similar. However, we then need a technical
assumption to ensure that consumer surplus is bounded, e.g., D(pr)=ηp−ε
r for D(pr) ≥
Q0 > 0,a n d
R Q0





s = A(Z − T)
βγ + H − ηlnQ0 − η + ηlnη − ηlnpr.




s = A(Z − T)
















s = A(Z − T)
βγ + H − p0Q0 +( p0 − pr)η,
where p0 is consumers’ highest willingness to pay for Q ∈ (Q0,η).I ne a c hc a s e ,as i m i l a r
p r o o fa st h ee l a s t i cd e m a n dc a s et h e ns h o w st h a tIs ≤ Im.
Appendix B.
In the paper, merchants are assumed to be identical. As a result, they always break
even regardless of interchange fees. Although this assumption help simplify our analysis,
it does not explicitly explain merchants’ motivation for lowering interchange fees. In this
appendix, we show that under a more realistic assumption that merchants are heteroge-
30nous in costs, their proﬁts are indeed negatively aﬀected by interchange fees in the same
way as the consumer surplus of card users.
As before, we assume a continuum of merchants sell a homogenous good in a com-
petitive market. A merchant θ incurs a ﬁxed cost W each period and faces an oper-
ational cost q
ϕ
θ /θ for its sale qθ,w h e r eϕ>1. Merchants are heterogenous in their
operational eﬃciency θ, which follows a Pareto distribution over the population with pdf
f(θ)=φJφ/(θ
φ+1), φ>1 and φϕ > 1+φ. Merchants have two options to receive
payments. Accepting non-card payments, such as cash, costs merchants τm,a per dollar.
Accepting card payments costs merchants τm,e+I per dollar. Therefore, a merchant who
does not accept cards (i.e., cash store) charges pa, while a merchant who accepts cards
(i.e., card store) charges pe. The share of card merchants is λ and the share of cash
merchants is 1 − λ.T h ev a l u e so fpa, pe,a n dλ are endogenously determined as follows.
Am e r c h a n tθ may earn proﬁt πθ,e for serving the card consumers:
πθ,e = Max
qθ






Alternatively, it may earn proﬁt πθ,a for serving the cash consumers:
πθ,a = Max
qθ






At equilibrium, ﬁrms of the same eﬃciency must earn the same for serving either card or
cash consumers. Therefore, it is required that
(1 − τm,e − I)pe =( 1− τm,a)pa. (9)
Note that the pricing of pe requires pa ≤ pe so that card stores do not attract cash
users. Eq. (9) then implies
I ≥ τm,a − τm,e.
Meanwhile, card users do not shop cash stores if and only if
(1 + τc,a)pa > (1 + τc,e − R) pe.





1 − τm,e − I
.
In addition, 1 − τm,e >Iso that pe is positive. Note all these interchange pricing con-
straints are the same as what we derived for identical merchants.















ϕ−1[(1 − τm,e − I)pe]
ϕ
ϕ−1 − W,
which would be the same at the equilibrium if it serves cash users.
Free entry condition requires that the marginal card merchant θ
∗ breaks even, so we
have





ϕ−1[(1 − τm,e − I)pe]
−ϕ.




qθ,ef(θ)dθ = Ψλ[(1 − τm,e − I)pe]
φϕ−1,





). At the same time, the total demand of goods by
card users is
Qd,e = ηe[(1 + τc,e − R)pe]
−ε,
where ηe is related to the measure of card users. Therefore, the good market equilibrium
achieved via card payments requires
Qs,e = Qd,e =⇒ Ψλ[(1 − τm,e − I)pe]
φϕ−1 = ηe[(1 + τc,e − R)pe]
−ε,
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where ηa is related to the measure of cash users.
















In the market, the total demand of card transaction value now becomes
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βγ−1.
Therefore, the card market equilibrium TD= TV implies
Θ(I − R − T)
βγ−1 =[ ηa(
1+τc,e − R
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As before, assuming the pricing constraint 1 − τm,e >I≥ τm,a − τm,e is not binding,




m = A(I − R − T)
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, (API Constraint)
Θ(I − R − T)
βγ−1 =[ ηa(
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Following a similar analysis as for identical merchants, we then can show merchants’
proﬁts are aﬀected by interchange fees in the same way as the card consumer surplus.
Particularly, when the API constraint is binding, the monopoly maximum satisﬁes the
following conditions:
Θ(I − R − T)
βγ−1 =( ηa + ηe)
ε−1
1−φϕ−ε(1 − τm,e − I)
(1−ε)(φϕ−1)









Deﬁne Z = I − R and ν =
−εφϕ




βγ−1 =( 1− τm,e − I)
ν−1(1 + τc,e − R)
−ν,
1+τc,e + Z − I





Note that ν T 1 if and only if ε T 1, so the equilibrium conditions are indeed equivalent
to what we derived for identical merchants.
Now merchants’ motivation for lowering interchange fees becomes clear. Credit card
34networks, given their market power, may charge higher interchange fees to maximize
card issuers’ proﬁts as card payments become more eﬃcient. Consequently, technology
progress or enhanced competition in the card industry drives up consumer rewards and
card transaction values, but may not increase consumer surplus or merchant proﬁts. Our
analysis suggests that by forcing down the interchange fee, after-reward retail prices may
decrease and card users’ consumption may increase. This could subsequently raise market
demand for merchant sales, and hence increase merchant proﬁts.
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